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We compare patterns of change in budgetary commitments by countries during periods of 
democracy and authoritarianism. Previous scholarship has focused almost exclusively on 
democratic governments, finding evidence of punctuated equilibria. Authoritarian regimes may 
behave differently, both because they may operate with fewer institutional barriers to choice and 
because they have fewer incentives to gather and respond to policy-relevant information coming 
from civil society. By analysing public budgeting in Brazil, Turkey, Malta, and Russia before 
and after their transitions from or to democracy, we can test punctuated equilibrium theory under 
a variety of governing conditions. Our goal is to advance the understanding of the causes of 
budgetary instability by leveraging contextual circumstances to push the theory beyond 
democracies and assess its broader applicability. 
 
 


























PET (punctuated equilibrium theory) describes how, as a consequence of disproportionate 
information processing, public policies alternate between long periods of stasis where negative 
feedback forces maintain the status quo and brief but dramatic periods of change. While the 
theory accurately describes a broad range of policy activities, studies of PET have looked almost 
exclusively at Western democracies, where the wide availability of public budgets and other 
policy indicators facilitate longitudinal analysis. For example, the 2009 article ‘A General 
Empirical Law of Public Budgets’ (Jones et al. 2009) focused on only European and North 
American democracies.  
We test PET across different political regimes. First, in the context of authoritarianism 
and democracy, we analyse public budgeting in Russia from 1998 to 2014, Turkey from 1970 to 
2004, and Brazil from 1964 to 2010 – periods including episodes of democracy and non-
democracy in each country. We then look at historical data from Malta during periods of colonial 
rule by the British (1826-1921), colonial self-government (1922-1936), and during a more recent 
period (2001-11) since that country’s 1964 independence.  
Democratic and other regimes might differ with regard to budgeting in two opposite 
ways.  On the one hand, autocrats face fewer public and formal checks and balances, possibly 
allowing them to respond quickly in reaction to shifting contexts; this could be called the 
‘institutional efficiency’ hypothesis.  One the other hand, democracies may have higher capacity 
to gather information about social and other issues because of mechanisms associated with 
electoral accountability, as well as stronger and more independent civil society organizations 
including the press; the ‘informational advantage’ hypothesis.   
Under the efficiency hypothesis, an autocrat, working with few institutional constraints 
such as generating a majority in a democratically elected and independent legislature, should be 
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able to shift spending priorities when advisors recognize the need to do so. This decision-making 
efficiency would lead us to expect fewer punctuations in regimes where power is concentrated in 
a decision-making élite who can operate with broad institutional latitude.  Institutional and 
decision-making frictions are lower, so decisions should be more efficient.  Indeed, ‘making the 
trains run on time’ is one of the main justifications for authoritarian rule, and democracies are 
often criticized for high decision costs if not deadlock and stalemate. 
Democracies have an advantage however when it comes to gathering information: they 
have many uncensored sources of demands, information, and feedback about the impact of 
current policies through a more vibrant network of civil society organizations, including political 
parties staffed by officials anxious to ‘feel the pulse’ of various constituencies.  Furthermore, a 
bureaucratic network gives democratic leaders the capacity to respond to information once it has 
been processed. By contrast, authoritarian regimes may be less capable of gathering, processing, 
and responding to information about societal problems because they have fewer independent 
sources of information, and indeed they may suppress certain kinds of information or have 
highly focused policy priorities. Subsequently, we would expect that the magnitude of 
punctuation in public budgets during periods of authoritarianism would be greater, as 
governments either fail to gather or ignore signals for longer than would be possible in 
democracies, only acting when problems grow so large that they threaten the stability of the 
regime.    
 Budget data for each country is compiled from various public records and to our 
knowledge the datasets assembled here are the longest and most accurate publicly available 
account of budgeting in any of the four countries. Empirical tests are straightforward and 
designed to distinguish between the two hypotheses. Using Freedom House scores, we classify 
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regimes as either ‘Not Free,’ ‘Partly Free,’ or ‘Free’ for each year of data. Then, for each 
country, we draw a distribution of budgetary changes corresponding to the different freedom 
scores. (For Malta, where our data pre-dates the Freedom House scores, we consider the period 
of self-government as more politically open relative to the period of British colonial rule.) Since 
our tests are pre- and post-transition within four countries that have experienced changes in 
forms of government, we effectively control for many other factors including culture, size of the 
budget, and complexity of the social issues facing the nation.  
Evidence strongly supports the information hypothesis, suggesting that any advantage 
authoritarian regimes gain through institutional efficiency is outweighed by informational 
constraints. We replicate these findings in the on-line appendix using alternative regime-
classification systems to divide the data, rather than Freedom House. These include Polity IV’s 
assessment of political competition, Unified Democracy Scores (U-Dem), Varieties of 
Democracy scores (V-Dem), and, finally, by simply using the historical record to identify 
periods of regime transition. Collectively the results favour the information hypothesis; evidence 
that our findings using Freedom House scores are robust. 
 The relative advantage that democratic regimes with a free system of the press and active 
social mobilizations have with regard to signal detection and problem recognition are poorly 
understood.  Indeed, we know of no budgetary research that systematically compares political 
regimes with regard to these issues. Our contribution is to develop Punctuated Equilibrium 
Theory by looking at the impact of institutional forms on patterns of budget reallocations. For all 
the regimes we examine there is a combination of policy stability and punctuations, implying 
that the distinction between authoritarianism and democracy (or different forms of democracy) 
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is, in a sense, not fundamental for understanding budget allocations.1 The levels of punctuation 
observed differ substantially, however. Theoretically we would expect democracies to have 
greater informational capacity than other political regimes and this idea finds support in the data. 
Indeed, the findings suggest that democratic informational efficiency is more important than 
non-democratic institutional efficiency. Relative budgetary stability can be added to the long list 
of attributes that favour democratic governance over its alternatives.  
Punctuated equilibrium 
Baumgartner and Jones developed PET in 1993 through in-depth case studies of particular policy 
issues, such as nuclear energy and pesticide use. They found that policy changes in these areas 
were predominately incremental, but that occasionally radically new ideas would gain 
momentum causing a tidal shift in government policies toward these issues. In later work (2005) 
they introduced a more generalized model to demonstrate that government policymaking is a 
fundamentally erratic process; it is characterized by long periods of equilibrium intermittently 
punctuated by dramatic changes. Their argument was this: because policymakers are boundedly 
rational and the processing capacity of political institutions is constrained by rules, governments 
are disproportionate processors of information. The effects on policy change are two-fold. On 
one hand, an extreme allegiance to the status quo is built into the system. If attention is scarce, 
most issues most of the time will be ignored and it is difficult to justify changing the status quo 
in the absence of attention. But, on the other hand, issues cannot be ignored indefinitely; societal 
                                                 
1 Existing PET scholarship underscores the fact that electoral change is not the only – or even primary – 
driver of policy change: ‘policy changes frequently stem from the emergence of new information or 
changes in the social or economic environment that are not so simply related to the electoral process’ 
(Baumgartner, Jones and Wilkerson 2011: 948). That these processes are also found in non-democratic 




problems will grow worse over time and eventually need to be addressed. When an issue finally 
receives attention, policymakers may be forced to enact dramatic policy changes, if only to catch 
up for the lack of moderate adjustments they failed to make as the problem slowly developed. 
Thus the model describes a system characterized by friction, where negative feedback forces are 
predominant, but occasionally give way to periods of rapid self-reinforcing change.  With 
policymakers responding only to a limited number of urgent problems at any given time, issues 
beneath a threshold level of urgency are put on the back burner as attention is focused on the 
most pressing issues; there are always more issues that deserve attention than time to attend to 
them. 
The implications of the model are that policy changes will fall into one of two categories: 
incremental when the status quo prevails, and dramatic during rare periods of imbalance. 
Empirical support for this prediction is substantial. A long line of scholarship finds that 
distributions of changes in public budgets display a punctuated equilibrium pattern, characterized 
by high central peaks, ‘weak shoulders’, and very long tails (Baumgartner et.al. [2009]; Breunig 
and Koski [2006]; Breunig, Koski, and Mortensen [2010]; Jones and Baumgartner [2005]; Jones 
et.al. [2009]; Jones, Sulkin, and Larsen [2003]; Robinson et.al. [2014]). This research focuses on 
kurtosis, a summary statistic that measures the peakedness of a distribution. Higher kurtosis is 
generally taken as evidence of greater friction in the policy process that produced the given 
change distribution.  
Policymaking in authoritarian regimes 
To date, Lam and Chan (2015) and Chan and Zhao (2016) have conducted the only tests of PET 
in the context of non-democracies (see also Pauw 2007 on South Africa; other tests have been in 
western democracies). Looking at the case of Hong Kong, Lam and Chan propose that non-
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democracies are characterized by less friction than democracies because the institutional design 
of these regimes centralizes power at the highest level of government, and yet, at the same time, 
the absence of these friction-including institutions also reduces external interferences to political 
processes. According to them, in the absence of electoral and participative mechanisms that are 
characteristic of democratic governments, officials lack the same incentives to monitor and 
respond to the external environment. Within such a system, Lam and Chan argue, under-response 
or stasis is extended; changes are reduced to prolong stability through mechanisms of negative 
feedback. However, the authors predict that pressure for change can build up to dangerous levels, 
especially when it reaches levels high enough to threaten the authority of the regime. The result 
of the two dynamics is a highly punctuated policy process ‘in which the policymaking process is 
too insulated to react until the built-up pressures can no longer be resisted. But once it happens, 
the policy response can be radical and extremely forceful’ (Lam and Chan 2015: 552). Chan and 
Zhao (2016) continue this inquiry, drawing on evidence from the People’s Republic of China. 
They find that informational restrictions are the main drivers of punctuated equilibrium, and also 
that there is a negative correlation between the level of punctuation across Chinese regions and 
the level of labour disputes – a proxy for regime threat. In other words, Chinese policymakers 
face informational disadvantages when compared to their democratic counterparts, but they 
become more responsive to signals from society when the regime’s existence is threatened.  
Of course, much scholarly attention outside of the PET framework has been dedicated to 
non-democratic governance and these studies help form our hypotheses. In non-democratic 
systems, without free and fair elections, the durability of the ruling élite is threatened only when 
problems have grown to such an extent that unrest, either within the regime or society at large, 
appears imminent. This erodes the informational capacity of authoritarian governments on two 
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fronts.2 First, it creates fewer incentives for leaders to seek out information. Indeed, structures 
that facilitate the flow of information in democracies, such as freedoms of speech and press, are 
often missing in authoritarian regimes and information is frequently censored or manipulated in 
favour of the regime. Although popular pictures of non-democracies might include elaborate 
mechanisms for observing the lives of citizens – from the Stasi’s data-collection architecture in 
the German Democratic Republic to the Kremlin’s heavy reliance on polling (Petrov, Lipman 
and Hale 2014) – the efficacy of such projects is fundamentally limited.3 Schedler (2013: 37) 
writes of the ‘structural opacity of authoritarian regimes’ – that is, the informational uncertainty 
generated by, among other things, the incentives for citizens not to reveal their sincere 
preferences for fear of adverse responses from the regime. Second, whatever information is 
received by policymakers can more easily be ignored – in the short-run, at least. Moreover, even 
when there is a desire to respond, the necessary bureaucratic capacity may be lacking, as many of 
the civil institutions through which democracies implement their policies are missing in non-
democratic societies (Tsebelis [2002]). In particular, democracies may be better at delegation, 
whereby numerous semi-autonomous bureaucrats work together to promote the social welfare; a 
level of cooperation that is often impossible for highly centralized regimes. 
 Another set of institutional features of democracies and authoritarian systems works 
potentially in another way. The autocrat controls the levers of government; the democratic leader 
                                                 
2 Recent literature on information in non-democracies has focused on authoritarian élites’ proclivity for 
opacity, with measures of regime transparency drawing on the extent of fiscal information disclosure (see 
Boix and Svolik [2013]; Hollyer, Rosendorff and Vreeland [2011]; Wehner and Renzio [2013]). In other 
words, the existing literature has looked predominately at data dissemination, rather than information 
collection. 
3 To be sure, all regimes – regardless of electoral conditions – are interested in monitoring societal 
conditions, as well as the opinions of its citizens. Moreover, all attempts to collect and analyse data are 
hampered by doubts about whether reports by subjects reflect sincere attitudes. However, there are good 
reasons to believe that non-democratic regimes face particularly acute epistemic limitations.  
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may have to negotiate more compromises.  So, whereas democratic leaders may get more signals 
and be more aware of changing social demands or trends, they may not have the capacity 
unilaterally to respond.  An independent legislature, a judicial body, or members of rival parties 
sharing control of a coalition government may refuse to cooperate; in sum, a democratic regime 
typically has some institutional barriers to action, and these are usually much greater than what 
would exist in an autocracy.4 To be sure, autocrats are not entirely free from institutional 
constraints, including intra-élite constraints (Roeder [1993]; Tsebelis [2002]). Our argument is 
simply that these constraints should be less than what is typically associated with democracies.  
Furthermore, many autocrats are likely to have grander ambitions than preventing civil unrest 
and may therefore be responsive to information under certain conditions. For example, autocrats 
sometimes create nominally democratic institutions in order to gather information, placate the 
opposition, or share power (for reviews, see Art [2012]; Brancati [2014]; Gandhi and Lust-Okar 
[2009]; Magaloni and Kricheli [2010]; Morse [2012]; and Pepinsky [2014]). Authoritarian 
regimes may therefore combine information search with the institutional freedom to act rapidly 
in order to solve developing social problems, thus greatly reducing overall levels of friction. 
Hypotheses 
We propose two competing hypothesis. The first is the ‘informational advantage’ hypothesis.5 
Every government has a certain threshold of institutional response. Below the threshold 
policymakers ignore problems; above the threshold they attempt to solve them. Non-democracies 
                                                 
4 Existing PET scholarship shows how much these institutional barriers matter when it comes to policy 
punctuations. Studies show that kurtosis is substantially higher for outcomes produced at latter stages of 
the policy process, where the cumulative effect of institutional friction is greatest (Baumgartner etl.al. 
[2009]; Jones and Baumgartner [2005]).   
5 Chan and Zhang (2016) make the same point, but write of ‘the information disadvantage of 
authoritarianism’, rather than the informational advantage of democracies.  
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have fewer reliable mechanisms to gather information about societal problems, so the response 
threshold may be higher than in democracies. Policymakers in authoritarian regimes can ignore 
problems to the point at which social discontent threatens regime stability. In democracies, 
problems can be safely ignored only until representatives worry that their constituents will vote 
them out of office. Voting is much less costly than revolt, so in general we can expect 
democracies to be more responsive to information.6 Thus, we hypothesize: 
Public budgeting in democracies will show lower levels of kurtosis than other political regimes.  
The counter hypothesis is that any information gains provided by democratic institutions 
are outweighed by the frictions that accompany such institutions. This is the ‘institutional 
efficiency’ hypothesis, which suggests that authoritarian leaders may be better situated to act to 
resolve social issues than their democratic counterparts The institutional efficiency hypothesis 
thus states:  
Public budgeting in autocracies will show lower levels of kurtosis than other political regimes.  
 
 Established PET studies seem to provide support to the institutional efficiency 
hypothesis. There is ample evidence, both within (Jones et al 2003) and across countries 
(Baumgartner et al 2009), that centralised institutions reduce decision-making costs resulting in 
less punctuated patterns of policy change. Existing comparative research, however, is mostly 
focused on democratic regimes. As such, it did not take into account significant variation in 
another key variable: censoring of information versus leaving it free and open. The existence of 
                                                 
6 An alternative specification of the theory, with identical empirical expectations, would be as follows: In 
any complex system of government, decision-makers under-respond to information signals from their 
environment that are below some threshold of urgency. Above that threshold, where their attention is 
focused, they over-respond. The result of this under- and over-response to signals based on their intensity 
generates a punctuated-equilibrium pattern of high stability in most policy domains most of the time (e.g. 
hyper-incrementalism) and large changes in a few domains where the signal suggests a possible crisis or 
need to “catch up.” As democratic regimes have an informational advantage (meaning they receive more 
signals), the degree of kurtosis there will be lower. 
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widely dispersed sources of information typical of democracies generates a greater ability to 
respond (Baumgartner and Jones 2015), and stronger incentives to do so. We can expect the 
informational advantage of democracy to be greater than the decision-making advantage of 
authoritarianism. Indeed, many of the elements of governance often portrayed as impediments to 
efficient decision-making in multiparty democracies featuring separation of powers or the need 
to placate multiple veto-players actually serve to bring in greater amounts of information to the 
system. Thus, we expect our empirical tests to show greater levels of efficiency in democracies 
compared to authoritarian regimes.  
We acknowledge that classifying regimes in a binary fashion – as either democratic or 
authoritarian – can be problematic, given the variety that this masks. In addition, and more 
broadly, any regime classification exercise is complicated by the persistent disagreements 
amongst scholars about typologies, measures, and relevant data. Our claim is only that the 
political freedoms and institutional structures typical of democratic governance affect patterns of 
budgetary change systematically. Drawing simple distinctions between regimes that are more or 
less democratic should be sufficient to capture these systematic differences. Building on this 
foundation, further research could undertake a nuanced exploration of how specific structures 
across regimes affect public budgets.  
Budget Data 
Previous scholarship has focused almost exclusively on Western democracies because these 
countries make longitudinal data readily available. Using original source documents, we 
introduce four new datasets: public budgets in Russia from 1998 to 2014, Turkey from 1970 to 
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2004, Brazil from 1964 to 2010, and Malta from 1827 to 1936 and from 2001 to 2011.7 These 
budget series are significant in that they span periods of authoritarian and democratic rule, 
allowing a unique test of PET theory. The focus on Russia, Turkey, Brazil, and Malta is 
governed principally by data availability; our empirical approach requires budgetary records that 
cover a regime transition and exist over a sufficiently long period of time to draw statistically 
meaningful distributions. Few countries fit these requirements and to our knowledge the data we 
assemble here is the most comprehensive in this regard (excluding the budget data from Hong 
Kong that has already been tested by Lam and Chan and data from China that was tested by 
Chan and Zang). The analysis gains from the dissimilarities – both geographic and political – 
between the four countries by allowing a test of the hypotheses under a variety of socio-political 
circumstances. Table 1 provides a summary of the data.8  
(Table 1) 
 
Note that for Russia, Brazil, and Malta, inconsistencies in the reporting and management 
of public records preclude the use of uninterrupted time series. Another limitation is that budget 
authority is unavailable for Malta; we use annual expenditures instead. Budget authority 
measures the amount of authorized spending, rather than the amount that was actually spent in a 
given year, and is therefore a better measure of governmental decision-making. However, budget 
authority is often unavailable and scholars have substituted it with expenditures. This does not 
                                                 
7 These dates correspond to calendar years of budget law passage, rather than fiscal years for planned 
budget spending. In the US, the Office of Management and Budget categorizes government expenditures 
into broad functional and more detailed subfunctional categories. The data for Russia, Turkey, Brazil, and 
Malta is grouped into categories that are roughly analogous to the US subfunctions; that is, the categories 
relate to relatively specific programmatic areas. For example, in Malta there are categories dedicated to 
‘care of the elderly’ and ‘airport development’. The appendix includes more details about data sources 
and composition.  
8 The number of observations reported in Table 1 relate to the number of spending category figures 
available, whereas the number of observations reported in later tables relate to percentage change figures.  
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appear to have a meaningful effect on findings: when both budget authority and expenditures are 
available distributional analysis has revealed similar levels of kurtosis across these measures.  
We also proceed with some caution as to the reliability of the budgetary record during 
periods of authoritarian government. Authoritarian regimes are known to repress or alter 
information, which may compromise the integrity of any budget data that is made public. A 
symptom of this is inconsistency in the use of budget categories during the authoritarian periods 
(although we find that such reclassifications are also relatively common during periods of 
democratic rule). Categories are often redefined from one year to the next, which limits our 
ability to assess longitudinal changes in budgetary priorities. This is more problematic in Russia 
and Brazil in particular, where our data covers lengthy periods of authoritarian rule, and less so 
for Turkey, which sees only relatively brief military interventions during our period of study, and 
Malta where the British kept accurate accounting records, known as ‘Colonial Blue Books’. We 
do not claim that the data we assemble for the authoritarian periods is complete in the sense that 
it records every allocation made by these regimes; rather, only that it is the most complete 
account that can be compiled from public records. That being said, we have no reason to believe 
that authoritarian regimes systematically repress either very small or very large allocations; 
censorship should be neutral with respect to the shape of budget distributions, although this 
claim should be tested in future work.9 We are also careful to only include those budget 
categories which are consistently defined between two years; that is, we exclude to the best of 
                                                 
9 One possibility that cannot be discounted with the data currently available is that authoritarian regimes hide major 
shifts in spending (either increases or cuts) by repressing budgetary records for the year in question. As Table 1 
makes clear, there are gaps in our times series. If anything, it seems more plausible that regime elites would be more 
likely to censor unpopular major shifts than incremental spending changes, although we have no evidence to back up 
this assumption. As a result, even if these same elites were to publicize popular major shifts in expenditures, the 
exclusion of unpopular large shifts would work against our expectations regarding the level of kurtosis. Put 
differently, it is plausible to assume that observed kurtosis levels would be even higher in authoritarian regimes if 
we were to include currently unavailable data.  
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our ability from the analyses any budget changes which might reflect a shift in the definition of 
the stated budget category rather than a substantive reallocation.10 Crucially, then, the changes 
we report below are real, not artefacts of shifting category definitions. (See the online appendix 
for explanations of the data sources used as well as descriptions of the budgeting process over 
time for the four country cases.) 
Results 
Freedom House attempts to quantify the political rights and civil liberties citizens enjoy. Based 
on these composite elements, Freedom House assigns countries a rank of ‘Worst of the Worst’, 
‘Not Free’, ‘Partly Free’, or ‘Free’. These aggregate scores are available annually from 1972 to 
2014 and the first step in our analysis is to assign each year of budgetary data its corresponding 
freedom score. For Brazil and Malta, budget data is available prior to 1972. Indeed, Maltese 
budgets are available as far back as 1827. Our main analysis excludes any year where we cannot 
assign a Freedom House score, but in the appendix (available online) we use the full time series 
when dividing the data based on regime transitions. For example, Malta transitioned from 
colonial rule to a period of colonial self-government in 1922. We find that results are highly 
consistent.  
 Having assigned Freedom House scores, we then calculate annual percent change values 
for each spending category. As discussed, there is some inconsistency across budget categories. 
If a category had a change in its substantive definition in a certain year or was not reported, we 
do not calculate a percent change value for that year in that category. We also take a new 
approach to accounting for inflation. The data spans years of political and economic turmoil; 
                                                 
10 Another option would be to aggregate upward by combining smaller programmatic areas of the budget into broad 
categories such as defense, social welfare, and agriculture. We found, however, that this leaves too few observations 
of budgetary change to draw reliable distributions.  
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each country introduced at least one new currency or experienced a significant currency 
revaluation during our period of study. This makes inflation adjustments difficult and in many 
cases there is no consensus within the scholarly community about how such adjustments should 
be made.11 Rather than adjusting for inflation prior to calculating percent changes (the standard 
approach in the literature), we calculate changes relative to total government growth in that year. 
For example, if a budget category saw an annual increase of 10 percent and the total budget for 
that year grew by 7 percent, we consider that a 3 percent increase for that category in that year. If 
instead the budget category saw a 10 percent decrease, then that would be counted as a 17 
decrease after factoring in overall budget growth. While atypical, this approach is both necessary 
given the historical context of our study and most importantly it preserves the essential element 
of the analysis, which is to assess how governments reprioritize problems.  Crucially, it has no 
practical effect on the shape of the budget change distributions, which is our concern.  It simply 
centres the change on an annual value of zero percent growth, whereas in fact the average growth 
could have been higher.  As our concern is whether the shape is close to Normal or has high 
kurtosis, shifting the mean in this manner is not a concern. And it comes with the substantial 
advantage of allowing us to compare cases with wildly divergent currency values and inflation 
rates. 
 We pool percentage change values into distributions for each country and each Freedom 
House score. The histogram bars simply represent the number of cases in which a given budget 
was changed by x percent, compared to its value in the previous year and the rate of overall 
government growth. Table 2 summarizes the results and Figure 1 presents the corresponding 
                                                 
11 The exception is Brazil, where there is an agreed upon ‘roadmap’ for adjusting historic currency values 
for inflation. For Brazil, we therefore calculate percentage changes using inflation adjusted amounts; the 
standard practice. Results for Brazil are robust to these specification issues.  
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distributions. Budgeting in each country follows a punctuated equilibrium pattern, with a tall 
central peak (indicating the predominance of incremental changes) and very wide tails 
(indicative of dramatic spending changes). This pattern is especially pronounced in Turkey 
during the ‘Partly Free’ period and least pronounced in Brazil during the ‘Free’ period, where the 
budget distributions come closest to the Normal. L-kurtosis is a standardized version of kurtosis 
that is robust against the disproportionate effects of outlying values. A Normal distribution has 
an L-kurtosis of 0.123, with higher values indicating greater leptokurtosis. Looking at the L-
kurtosis values in Table 1 confirms the visual evidence from the figures: budgeting is leptokurtic.  
(Table 2) 
 
(Figure 1)  
 
Evidence supports the information hypothesis rather than the institutional hypothesis in all three 
cases. In each country the transition toward greater freedom (and a more open system of 
government) corresponds with a drop in L-kurtosis, indicating a lower magnitude of punctuation 
during these periods. While the differences in L-kurtosis are only modest, they all point in the 
same direction. Furthermore, these findings are consistent with evidence presented by Lam and 
Chan (2015) that L-kurtosis is lower during periods of democratic governance. Collectively the 
results are compelling and suggest that democratic structures provide a powerful informational 
advantage, which conditions the policymaking process.12 Note, however, that greater freedom is 
not so important as to outweigh other inter-country differences. For example, the budget 
distribution during the ‘Not Free’ period in Russia is still closer to the normal than the 
                                                 
12 The appendix replicates these findings for Brazil and Turkey after excluding periods of economic turmoil from the 
data. (For Russia, periods of economic upheaval are an approximate match to the periods of missing data.) A 
concern would be if budgetary instabilities correspond with economic distributions and that in turn these disruptions 
are more likely during authoritarian governance. We find that excluding these potentially problematic years does not 
substantively change the results.  
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distribution for the ‘Free’ period in Turkey. Political freedoms are important, but we still have a 
long way to go in explaining budgetary patterns across countries.  
Colonial and independent Malta 
Malta was part of the British Empire from 1826 until 1964 and because the British kept detailed 
management records of all their colonies, it is possible to assemble budget data for Malta during 
almost the entire colonial period. This is what we do. We assembled the dataset referencing the 
original colonial ‘Blue Books’ for the period 1827-1936. To our knowledge this is the first test of 
PET in a colonial setting. It also provides a further test of our hypotheses. Malta was granted 
home-rule by the British in 1921, so while still a colony, this marked an important transition 
toward a more open and participatory form of government. We can therefore divide the colonial 
era into two periods, with the expectation that political freedoms should be greater during the 
period when the Maltese people could run their own government. Finally, we complement our 
analysis of the colonial period with recent data covering the decade 2001-2011 that we obtained 
from Malta’s National Statistics Office. We can thus compare colonial with independent Malta, a 
fully free country – and for most of the time covered, also a member of the European Union. In 
this way, we can replicate the study of the effect of transition to full democracy on the case of 
Malta. Figure 2 shows change distributions for these three periods.13  
(Figure 2)  
 
During the period of British rule, the L-kurtosis associated with the distribution is 0.652, 
but when the Maltese gain greater autonomy through the transition to home rule L-kurtosis is 
                                                 
13 For Malta, kurtosis scores associated with the democratic period are highly sensitive to the inclusion of small 
expenditure values. This is always a concern when estimating the kurtosis of percent change distributions. It is easier 
for policymakers to make a large change to a small base value, but these instabilities are less reflective of true policy 
punctuations than random fluctuations around a small number. Frequently analysts will address this problem by 
excluding small base values and this is what we do here, dropping expenditures less than $1 million euros from the 
Malta analysis. Similar diagnostics are conducted for each country, but in these cases kurtosis scores are robust to 
this issue.  
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0.569. L-kurtosis is even lower (0.499) during the 2001-2011 period, after full consolidation 
following independence and transition to democracy.14 This continues the trend established by 
the previous analysis. As governments transition toward greater freedom, their budgetary 
processes gain stability. Gains in informational capacity provided for by democratic structures 
seem clearly to outweigh any institutional efficiency afforded by authoritarian government. Our 
information hypothesis is confirmed and we can reject the efficiency hypothesis.  
Conclusion 
A robust literature has now explored PE theory with regard to budgeting, but that literature has   
almost exclusively been focused on advanced industrial democracies, with some attention to 
subnational budgets (e.g., states, municipalities, and school districts) within these nations.  Here 
we present just the second example of detailed attention to the shape of budgetary change in non-
democratic settings, building on the work of Lam and Chan (2015) and Chan and Zhao (2016). 
This focus has revealed systematic differences in the way that democracies and non-democracies 
process and respond to information. Studies of Western governments have taken findings of 
budgetary punctuations as evidence for the disproportionate processing of information by 
policymakers and we find that these punctuations are even more pronounced in the context of 
non-democracy. This suggest that when it comes to information processing and response, 
democratic governance has an advantage over more authoritarian forms.  
We hope to expand on the analysis presented above, which must first start with more data 
collection in non-democratic systems, as well as exploring the various mechanisms democratic 
and authoritarian regimes use to gather information and act on it. In particular, as we collect 
                                                 
14 That the data are unbalanced in the sense that there is sometimes more data for the non-democratic periods 
(Russia, Brazil, and Malta) and sometimes more for the democratic periods (Turkey) should not affect the results. 
There are sufficient observations in each period to draw statistically meaningful distributions and thus any 
systematic differences in budgetary behaviour should reveal themselves. 
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more data from different types of regimes, it may be possible to pinpoint particular institutions or 
civil rights that affect the informational capacity of governments, and subsequently their 
decision-making processes. In addition, we hope to collect more nuanced data on other variables 
of interest – particularly economic instability – in order to exclude alternative explanations for 
distribution differences across regime types. We also note that there is great inter-state variation 
in the shape of budgetary change distribution – variation that a focus on political regimes appears 
insufficient in explaining. Ultimately we would hope to gain a better understanding of all factors 
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Table 1. Data characteristics.  
Country Time Period N Budget Type 
Russia 1998-2003; 2004-2006; 2010-2014 1,260 Budget Authority 
Turkey 1970-2004 1,046 Budget Authority 
Brazil 1964-1985; 1995-2010 1,810 Budget Authority 
Malta 1827-1937; 2001-2011 3,074 Expenditures 
 
Table 2. Kurtosis by Freedom House rankings. 
Country Time Period N Kurtosis L-kurtosis 
Russia     
Partly Free 1998-2003 435 74.21 0.446 
Not Free 2004-2006; 2010-2014 526 98.49 0.515 
Turkey     
Partly Free 1970-1972; 1979-2004 746 457.00 0.706 
Free 1973-1978 161 95.39 0.657 
Brazil     
Partly Free 1972-1985; 1995-2001 979 87.36 0.354 









Figure 1. Change distributions by Freedom House rankings. 
A) Russia, Not Free.    B) Russia, Partly Free. 
 
C) Turkey, Partly Free.   D) Turkey, Free. 
  




Figure 2. Colonial budgeting in Malta. 
A) British rule.         B) Self rule. 
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A. Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics 
B. Robustness Tests 
C. Descriptions of the Budgeting Process in Each Country 
 
For reasons of space, we have not included in the main print-version of our article detailed 
descriptions of our data sources, as well as how the budgetary process works in each of the 
countries studied. We provide that information here. 
A. Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics 
Russia 
 
Russian spending figures are drawn from a variety of sources. In order to calculate changes in 
spending priorities over time, we need unamended, overall spending figures – that is, figures 
drawn from the original budget law for a particular year, and that cover both classified and 
unclassified spending. The relevant appendix (attached to budget laws) containing these figures 
is titled Raspredelenie raskhodov federal'nogo biudzheta po razdelam i podrazdelam 
funktsional'noi klassifikatsii raskhodov biudzhetov Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Distribution of 
expenditures of the federal budget by sections and subsections of the functional spending 
classification of budgets of the Russian Federation),15 which provides a breakdown of total 
spending (unclassified and classified combined) by functional spending category. These 
                                                 
15 The wording varies slightly across years.  
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appendices are available for the 1999 to 2007 budgets from the legal information portal 
Zakonodatel'stvo Rossii – an official resource curated by the Federal Protection Service 
(Federal'naia sluzhba okhrany).16 Beginning with the 2008 budget, however, this appendix has 
not been made public, with a draft version not introduced for open legislative consideration and 
the final version not released along with the budget law. As Cooper (2007: 2) argues, ‘[b]y 
dropping the usual appendix providing a functional breakdown of total budget expenditure, an 
unprecedented degree of classification of the budget has been achieved, in addition to the 
traditional practice of declaring some appendix secret’. 
Fortunately, spending figures for the 2012 to 2015 budgets are included in the Federal 
Exchequer’s (Federal’noe kaznacheistvo) quarterly reports on budget implementation.17 2011 
budget spending figures are included in the Audit Chamber’s (Schetnaia palata) report on the 
main supplementary budget bill.18 Although figures for 2009 are available from the same source, 
figures from 2008 and 2010 are not available, meaning it is not possible to calculate change 
statistics. Although these sources allow us to track diachronic spending shifts for a number of 
years in non-democratic Russia, it is not clear why these bodies are allowed to publish 
information which appears to be classified by the Government.  
For the 1998-2014 period under examination, three different spending category 
classification systems were used: 1999-2004 (26-27 categories); 2005-2010 (11 categories); and 
2011-2014 (14 categories). Beyond these changes, nine observations have been deleted due to 
concerns about the comparability of spending figures – that is, that the associated change 
statistics reflect changes in reporting practices rather than actual shifts in spending priorities.   
                                                 
16 The website address is http://pravo.gov.ru.  
17 These reports are available here: http://www.roskazna.ru/ispolnenie-byudzhetov/federalnyj-byudzhet/.  





The dataset for Brazil is comprised of the available authorized budget data reported by the IBGE 
from 1964 to 1985 and the authorized budget data reported in the Brazilian Budgetary Law (Lei 
Orçamentária Anual, LOA) from 1995 to 2010. The data have been converted into 2014 Reais 
(R$) and are listed by topic codes that cover the executive, legislative, and judicial branches and 
their subtopics. The formulas for monetary and inflation adjustment were calculated based on the 
dates of approval of the LOAs. We rely on different sources of data because the Brazilian 
Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) does not report the authorized budget, but the 
executed budget, from 2001 on. The IBGE and LOA data sets are nevertheless comparable, since 
both data sets report budget authority data. 
We do not investigate public budgeting during the period in which Brazil was drafting its 
new constitution or the first years after democratization (1986 to 1994). The existing IBGE 
budget data for the period of 1986-1994 are not entirely reliable. For instance, Brown (2002) 
finds that the country’s debt crisis led to accounting changes that render comparisons after 1987 
very difficult. As indicated by our data set, this limitation is only circumvented with the 
establishment of the Real plan in 1994. 
Altogether, the dataset has 105 different budget categories, which are all the categories 
reported in the IBGE and in the LOA data sets for both periods. The sum of budget categories 
reported for each year yields the total budget of each year.19 While 105 categories existed during 
the time period of our study, not all categories exist in each year. Rather, categories vary across 
and within political regimes because the Brazilian government altered them throughout the years. 
                                                 
19 In order to calculate the total budget for each year, one needs to exclude the following categories: 
10000 (Executive Branch), 30000 (Legislative Branch as reported in the authoritarian period) 30500 
(Legislative Branch as reported in the democratic period), 50000 (Judicial Branch), and 90400 (Other 
expenses). These categories represent the sum of several subcategories, which are included separately and 
are therefore redundant.  
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These modifications occur in the democratic period because the president has the power to 
create, modify or extinguish ministries, secretaries, and public administration bodies through 
special legislation. To illustrate, the budget category that represents the expenses of the Ministry 
of Agriculture takes on the following names in the data set: ‘Ministério da Agricultura’, 
‘Ministério da Agricultura, Abastecimento e Reforma Agrária’, ‘Ministério da Agricultura e do 
Abastecimento’, ‘Ministério da Agricultura, Pecuária e Abastecimento’, and ‘Ministério do 
Desenvolvimento Agrário’. These differences are not limited to nomenclature, but reflect 
substantive changes in the scope and purpose of the Ministry of Agriculture. As indicated 
previously, in our analysis we included only budget categories which are consistently defined 
between two years. 
Turkey 
Turkish budget data come from the General Directorate of Budget and Fiscal Control (BFC; 
Bütçe ve Mali Kontrol Müdürlüğü), a subunit of the Ministry of Finance in Turkey. Appendices 
for budget allocation decisions for the period of 1924-2005 have been made public (in English 
and Turkish) at the BFC’s website. A larger body of data about fiscal policy, including the period 
of the Ottoman Empire, was published in multiple studies (Shaw and Shaw 1977)20. 
The budget data available at the BFC’s website provides a breakdown of total spending 
by spending category. This classification shows how much money is allocated to each spending 
unit (ministries and government organizations) for a fiscal year. These figures include data on 
‘allocated funding’, ‘actual spending’ and ‘budget share’. The number of spending units does not 
change much over time, with the range being 30-36. As is mentioned previously, we do not 
                                                 
20 T., 2003. Osmanlı malı̂ istatistikleri bütçeler, 1841-1918 (Vol. 7). TC Başbakanlık Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü. 
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calculate annual change statistic for inconsistent spending units that undertook organizational 
change.  
There is no missing data in Turkish spending figures for the period under examination. 
Except some years in the late 1800s, allocated funds along with actual spending can be found at 
the BFC’s website21 and in Güran (2003).  
Malta 
Maltese spending figures are drawn from two different sources. For a large part of the British 
colonial period (1813-1964), the British authorities published ‘Blue books’, which were recently 
digitalised and published online at: 
https://nso.gov.mt/en/nso/Historical_Statistics/Malta_Blue_Books/Pages/Malta-Blue-
Books.aspx. Such books provided a wealth of information on such socio-economic aspects as 
population, currencies, trade and currencies, education and climate (but occasionally even 
description of botanic species or street maps). Spending figures were regularly included in the 
Blue books in a dedicated chapter on ‘net revenue and expenditure’, which we digitalised and put 
in spreadsheets. Blue books cover the period 1821-1937, with the only gaps in 1823 and 1826. 
Because the gaps were concentrated at the beginning of the time series, and also to avoid 
possible biases associated to the changeover between the old currency (scudo) and the ‘new’ one 
(pound sterling) that happened in 1826, we only used data starting from 1827. Expenditures data 
were recorded at a rather detailed level, and spending categories were relatively stable 
considering the long time covered. We counted 147 different categories that were used at least 
two consecutive times and were thus useful to calculate budget changes. Of these, 79 categories 
                                                 
21 http://www.bumko.gov.tr/?_Dil=2  
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recurred at least ten times. Spending figures for 2001 to 2011 are available from the European 
Union’s Classification of the Functions of Government (COFOG) dataset.  
B. Robustness Tests 
Regime Classification 
Concerns about the effect of regime-classification variation on the results reported in the article 
motivate us to pursue various robustness tests. If results consistently point in the same direction 
after multiple replications, this should lend greater credibility to our conclusions, even if certain 
concerns about data quality remain. In the article, we use Freedom House scores to separate 
authoritarian and democratic regimes. This appendix replicates our analysis using three 
alternative classification systems: Polity IV, Varieties of Democracy, and Unified Democracy 
Scores.   
Polity IV codes ‘the authority characteristics of states in the world system for purposes of 
comparative, quantitative analysis’ (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2013). Specifically, we use 
Polity IV codes corresponding to political competition. We have theorized that it is the electoral 
connection that provides leaders in democratic regimes with the incentive to seek out and engage 
with policy information, so it makes sense to look at political competition. Polity IV divides 
regimes into five levels of political competition: repressed, suppressed, factional, transitional, 
and competitive. Every year of available budget data for Russia corresponds with the 
‘transitional’ period for political competition, offering no opportunity for comparison. Malta is 
not coded at all under Polity IV, so our replication looks at only Brazil and Turkey. Table A1 
displays the kurtosis statistics corresponding to the distribution of changes associated with each 
level of political competition.  
Table A1. Kurtosis by Polity IV (Political Competition).  
Country Time Period N Kurtosis L-kurtosis 
Turkey     
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Factional 1971-1972; 1979-1981; 1996-2004 350 208.26 0.779 
Transitional  1973-1978; 1983-1995 531 91.14 0.440 
Brazil     
Repressed 1966-1974 264 10.90 0.651 
Suppressed 1975-1985 368 47.11 0.467 
Transitional  1995-2010 595 40.40 0.382 
 
 
For both Brazil and Turkey, L-kurtosis decreases substantially moving from periods of 
low to higher political competition. This provides additional support for the informational 
advantage hypothesis. Political competition forces leaders to engage with policy information, as 
an administration that is unresponsive to shifting environmental challenges will be voted out of 
office.  
The new ‘Varieties of Democracy’ (V-Dem) classification system offers measures of five 
principles of democracy (electoral, liberal, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian) and these 
are disaggregated into a variety of variables measuring such things as judicial independence, 
electoral regularity, and gender equality (Coppedge et.al. 2015b). From the V-Dem databank, we 
use a composite variable called the electoral democracy index, which captures Robert Dahl’s 
institutions of polyarchy: freedom of association, suffrage, clean elections, elected executive, and 
freedom of expression (Coppedge et.al. 2015b). Countries can receive scores of either 0, 0.25, 
0.5, 0.75, or 1, with higher scores indicating greater electoral accountability. The V-Dem 
codebook (Coppedge et.al. 2015a) suggests that the scores can be associated with ‘closed 
autocratic,’ ‘autocratic,’ ‘ambivalent,’ ‘minimally democratic,’ and ‘democratic’ regimes. Table 
A2 shows the results of the distributional analyses using V-Dem’s electoral democracy index to 
divide the data. If there are fewer than 100 observation associated with an electoral democracy 
score, that period is not included in the analysis over concerns about the reliability of 
distributions drawn from small datasets. (Malta is not rated by the V-Dem system and therefore 






Table A2. Kurtosis by Varieties of Democracy scores. 
Country Time Period N Kurtosis L-kurtosis 
Turkey     
Ambivalent 1984-1989 155 49.16 0.441 
Minimally Democratic 1971-1979; 1990-2004 624 366.89 0.735 
Brazil     
Autocratic  1965-1985 668 30.36 0.853 
Democratic  1995-2010 595 40.40 0.382 
Russia     
Ambivalent 1998-2002 343 74.81 0.433 
Autocratic  2002-2003; 2004-2006; 2010-2012 438 37.70 0.497 
 
 
Results are mixed. Brazil shows a dramatic reduction in kurtosis moving from a more 
autocratic to a more democratic period; evidence supportive of the informational advantage 
hypothesis. For Russia, the results point in the same direction, but the magnitude of change is 
smaller. The results for Turkey are, in contrast, supportive of the institutional efficiency 
hypothesis: more democratic years are associated with higher L-kurtosis. V-Dem rates Turkey as 
0.75, minimally democratic, throughout the 1970s, 1990s, and 2000s, during which the country 
experienced two military interventions. Freedom House distinguishes the late 1970s as a period 
of greater freedom and categorizes all other years as ‘partly free’. So, there are considerable 
discrepancies in the way the V-Dem electoral democracy index and Freedom House classify 
Turkey and they affect the results of the distributional analysis. 
Finally, we use Unified Democracy Scores (U-Dem), which are estimated using Bayesian 
statistical models to create a general scale of democracy based on thirteen measures of regime 
type (Pemstein, Meserve, and Melton 2010). The scale is continuous, ranging from -0.50 for the 
most autocratic regimes to 0.50 for the most democratic. We subdivide this continuous measure 
into four U-Dem quartiles so that we have enough observations in each quartile to draw change 
distributions. Table A3 shows the results of distributional analyses that group budgetary changes 
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based on these quartiles. If there are fewer than 100 observations in a quartile we do not draw a 




Table A3. Kurtosis by Unified Democracy scores. 
Country Time Period N Kurtosis L-kurtosis 
Turkey     
1st Quartile (Least Freedom) 1973; 1983-2003 594 580.00 0.664 
3rd Quartile 1974-1979 187 110.13 0.623 
Brazil     
1st Quartile (Least Freedom) 1965-1974 300 12.63 0.690 
2nd Quartile 1975-1985 368 47.11 0.467 
4th Quartile (Most Freedom) 1995-2010 595 40.40 0.382 
Russia     
2nd Quartile 2004-2005; 2011-2012  265 38.37 0.520 
3rd Quartile 1998-2003; 2005-2006 516 76.43 0.440 
 
L-kurtosis estimates for Brazil, Russia and Turkey support the informational advantage 
hypothesis. In all three cases, L-kurtosis is lower during periods of greater political freedom, 
although for Russia and Turkey the differences are smaller in magnitude than the differences 
found in Brazil.  
By using the various classification systems, we gain consistent measures of the 
democratic tendencies of different regimes over time. But the historical span of these systems is 
limited and for Malta we have budget data from much further back in time than regime-
classification data is available. Furthermore, there are always some concerns about the accuracy 
of generalized classification systems.  For these reasons, we replicate our analysis using regime 
transitions as the dividing points in the data. That is, we simply look at the historical record and 
note (to the best of our ability) the points at which one regime fell and was replaced by another. 




Table A4. Kurtosis by regime. 
Country Time Period N Kurtosis L-kurtosis 
Russia     
Democracy 1998-2003 435 74.21 0.446 
Authoritarian  2004-2006; 2010-2014 526 98.49 0.515 
Turkey     
Democracy  1970-1978; 1982-1995; 1997-2004 484 454.37 0.736 
Military 1979-1981; 1996 69 4.91 0.195 
Brazil     
Military 1964-1985 944 80.70 0.376 
Democracy 1995-2010 866 229.78 0.283 
Malta     
Colonial 1827-1921 2,675 565.68 0.652 
Colonial Self-Rule 1922-1936 499 122.93 0.569 
Democracy 2001-2011 380 71.11 0.499 
 
Using the longer data series for Brazil and the different dividing points for each country 
does not substantively alter the results. (The exception is Turkey, where the low number of cases 
during periods of military rule create concerns about the robustness of distributional statistics.) 
For the most part, however, we still see a lower magnitude of punctuation during periods of 
greater political openness. Altogether, we have conducted sixteen tests of the hypotheses (across 
countries and classification systems) and twelve of these tests support the informational 
advantage hypothesis. So, while the results are not unequivocal, they point strongly in one 
direction and appear to reflect real differences in the abilities of democracies to process and act 
on information.  
Economic analysis 
Concerns about alternative explanations motivate us to engage in another robustness test. Brazil, 
Russia, and Turkey experienced economic instability during the periods analyzed in this paper. 
Thus, we need to account for the possibility that it is economic instability, and not difference in 
regime type, that explains the kurtosis patterns we observe. This issue is less problematic for 
Russia because the years of economic crisis are already excluded from our data set given our 
inability to compute spending change statistics for the 2008, 2009, and 2010 budgets. We rely on 
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existing literature to define the years of economic collapse for the two other countries. For 
Turkey, we exclude the years of 1994 and 2001 (Celasun [1998]; Özatay and Sak [2002]; Akyüz 
and Boratav [2003]; Macovei [2009]; Öniş [2009]). For Brazil, we exclude the second period of 
the military regime (1975-1985), during which the country experienced oil shocks and debt 
crises; and the years of 1995, 1998, 1999, and 2001, during which the country was hit by 
different financial crises (Skidmore [1988]; Skidmore et al. [2010]; Toshniwal [2012]). Table A5 
reports the results of this analysis using Freedom House scores: L-kurtosis still declines moving 
from partly free to free periods. In fact, results remain unaltered across multiple replications of 
this analysis using Polity IV, V-Dem, U-Dem scores and historical records. 
Table A5. Kurtosis by Freedom House rankings (years of economic crisis excluded) 
Country Time Period N Kurtosis L-
kurtosis 
Brazil     
Partly 
Free 
1975-1985; 1996-1997; 2000 222 26.01 0.433 
Free 2002-2010  210 12.03 0.319 
Turkey     
Partly 
Free 
1970-1972; 1979-1993; 1995-2000; 2002-2004 718 439.80 0.710 
Free 1973-1978 161 95.38 0.657 
 
C. Descriptions of the Budgeting Process in Each Country 
Russia 
The political environment has varied considerably in post-Soviet Russia. Following the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, the country experienced an unprecedented level of political competition, 
media freedom, and economic liberty. However, the concomitant collapse in state capacity meant 
that President Yeltsin’s tenure, 1991-1999, was also marked by economic turbulence, threats to 
the territorial integrity of the federation, and ‘feckless pluralism’ (Carothers 2002: 10) instead of 
consolidated multi-party politics. In response to this impression of disorder, Vladimir Putin set 
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out on a project of re-establishing state control on his election to the presidency in 2000 — an 
aim aided greatly by the concurrent rise in world oil prices.  
Although there are notable differences in how post-Soviet Russia’s political system has 
been classified, there is a broad consensus of an authoritarian turn under the leadership of 
President Putin. Freedom House changed its classification of Russia from ‘Partly Free’ in 2003 
to ‘Not Free’ in 2004, citing ‘the virtual elimination of influential political opposition parties 
within the country and the further concentration of executive power’ (Freedom House 2005). 
Along with executive dominance over the legislature — thanks to the rising seat share of the 
‘party of power’, United Russia — the Putin administration clamped down on media freedom, 
removing most independent television news outlets. In addition, oligarchs with political 
pretensions — most notably Mikhail Khodorkovsky — were threatened into exile or imprisoned.  
This narrative of increased executive control was also reflected in budgetary practices. 
Whereas budgets passed in the 1990s were subject to intense lobbying during legislative passage, 
often resulting in delayed promulgation and making the final laws un-implementable (Troxel 
2003), budgeting in the 2000s became a much more orderly affair, with fewer channels for 
outside influence on executive tax and spending decisions. However, the rising dominance of the 
executive branch and apparent subsequent gains in institutional efficiency went hand-in-hand 
with the loss of information transparency. Beginning with the 2008 budget, complete spending 
figures broken down by functional sub-category have not been made public by the Russian 
Government – something that, according to Cooper (2007: 2), constitutes an ‘unprecedented 
degree of classification [opacity] of the budget’.22 Beyond the markedly reduced influence of the 
                                                 
22 As described in the appendix, spending figures for later years are taken from reports produced by other 
state bodies involved in the budget process, which – for unknown reasons – are able to make public 
ostensibly classified information.  
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legislature in the decision-making process, increased opacity appears to be another way in which 
budgeting processes can differ between periods of democracy and non-democracy (see Wehner 
and Renzio 2013).  
Turkey 
The history of Turkish democracy can best be described by large fluctuations starting from the 
multiparty politics in 1950. Although the end of single-party political system was of great 
importance for the democratization of Turkish politics, the newly elected government under the 
leadership of Adnan Menderes soon embraced undemocratic practices to restrict opposition 
activities. As the deteriorating relations between government and opposition reached its nadir in 
1960, the military intervened in politics for the first time since the establishment of the Republic 
(1923), removing the government party from office and executing its leaders. Shortly afterwards, 
in 1961, elections were held and Turkish politics entered into a new phase, one in which 
polarization and political violence increased dangerously to the point at which the military 
intervened in politics for the second time by delivering memoranda. However, violence and 
political instability continued to develop (Tachau and Heper 1983). In the following ten years, 
politics was mostly dominated by unstable coalitions and minority governments, resulting in 
right-wing/left-wing political violence. For the third time, in 1980, the military took control of 
the government and banned all the political activities temporarily until 1983. The influence of 
military on politics has been restricted only after late 2000s during the AKP’s (Justice and 
Development Party) government.  
Although Turkish politics faced three military interventions in two decades (1960, 1971 
and 1980), the role that the military played was categorized as ‘moderator’ and ‘guardian’ as 
these military regimes ended soon after the political authority was restored (Tachau and Heper 
1983). Instead, the conditions that put Turkey among ‘partly-free’ countries emerged under civil 
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governments. An electoral threshold of 10 percent that prevented certain parties from winning 
seats in parliament and bans on political activity of the Kurdish élite harmed political rights and 
civil liberties in Turkey during the 1990s. Moreover, freedom of expression had long been 
limited in Turkey; many journalists were accused of insulting state officials and imprisoned in 
1999 (see Freedom House 1999; section on Turkey), which received much attention particularly 
from the EU and leading non-profit organizations. 
The Turkey data covers the period of 1970 to 2004. The first period, 1970-1972, is 
categorized as partly free; 1973-1978, free; and 1979-2004 again partly free. The latter period 
coincided with the rise of the Kurdish movement in the country: Turkey’s treatment of its 
Kurdish citizens has been the main obstacle to the democratization of Turkish politics (Ergil 
2000). There are good reasons to expect that certain political and social groups were isolated 
from the decision-making process and their demands were not taken into consideration during 
this period.  
Brazil 
Our analysis focuses on the years of authoritarian rule (1964-1985), and, in the democratic 
period, the years of centre party rule (PSDB, 1995-2002, during which the president was 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso) and the years of left party rule (Workers’ Party, or the PT, 2003-
2010, during which the president was Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva). The authoritarian years under 
the Brazilian military can be divided into two periods. The first (1964-1974) was characterized 
by the dominance of a hard-liner group of military officers, economic prosperity, and the relative 
absence of social unrest. The second (1975-1985) was characterized by the dominance of the 
moderate group of military officers, economic crisis, and presence of social unrest.  
The first period of the military regime was marked by the severe restriction of political 
and civil rights. The government interfered in almost all labour unions and civil society 
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organizations, strikes were banned and student movements were declared to be extinct. Political 
rights were also suspended. The government established indirect elections for presidents and 
governors. Only two political parties were allowed to exist: the ARENA (Aliança Renovadora 
Nacional), the regime party, and the MDB (Movimento Democrático Brasileiro), the opposition 
party. During this period, rulers temporarily shut down Congress in 1968 and edited the AI5 
(Institutional Act 5), suspending all democratic rights and constitutional freedom.  
During the second period of the military regime, Brazil’s economy started to suffer the 
effects of the oil shock of 1973 combined with the maintenance of investments in unfavourable 
conditions. Although the government tried to contain the crisis, a second oil shock (1979) 
jeopardized its plan. The annual rate of inflation did not stop growing during this period, which 
did not stop the Brazilian military regime from focusing on economic growth at all costs 
(Skidmore 1988). President João Figueiredo, the last military ruler to occupy office, turned to the 
IMF (International Monetary Fund) for assistance (Baer 2014) in 1982. Ernesto Geisel, who took 
office in 1974, had committed his government to starting the process of political opening 
(Huntington 1991). Several sectors of society began to organize in this period (for instance, the 
‘Diretas Já’ movement demanded direct presidential elections between 1983 and 1984), which 
increased the pressure for the government to promote institutional reforms (such as the end of the 
censorship of radio and television in 1978). 
The transition to democracy occurred in March 1985 when President José Sarney took 
office after the death of Tancredo Neves, who had been indirectly elected president by an 
electoral college. Freedom House notes the transition, changing its classification of Brazil from 
‘Partly Free’ to ‘Free’ in 1985.23 These political changes also marked the beginning of a 
                                                 
23 Freedom House ranks the country as Partly Free again from 1993-2002. Such classification is justified 
by increases in violence and lawlessness on the part of the police, upsurge of organized crime, lack of 
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tumultuous economic period. From 1985 to 1994, Brazil had four different currencies (Cruzado, 
Cruzado Novo, Cruzeiro, and Cruzeiro Real). The country suffered with hyperinflation that 
reached levels as high as of 81.3 percent in a single month in 1990 (Bresser, Pereira, and Nakano 
1991). Budget data for this period is scarce and unreliable. For these reasons we exclude 1986 to 
1994 from our analysis.  
Malta 
Malta was under direct rule of the British Crown since 1800. British troops were called to 
liberate the island from the Napoleonic army after only two years of French domination, which 
in turn had posed an end to the unique confederal theocracy of the Order of St. John, known as 
the government of the Knights. When the British took over Malta, they centralized decisions 
under their authority. Ever since, the political history of colonial Malta was one of continuous 
requests of self-government by the Maltese, and reluctant, intermittent concessions by the UK 
(Frendo 2000). 
The British rule of the first decades was effectively a ‘gubernatorial autocracy’ (Cremona 
1997). Representatives of the Maltese population were kept out of any decision-making body, 
and civil liberties were suppressed. The King bluntly rejected the requests of constitutional 
government, representative political bodies, independent tribunals, and freedom of expression. 
Representation in a consultative Council of Government with consultative powers was first 
granted in 1835; Maltese members, however, were a minority, and they were appointed rather 
than elected. 
                                                 
respect for indigenous rights, and corruption within the federal government. From 2003 on, Freedom 
House ranks the country as Free due to improvements in political rights. In particular, Freedom House 
highlights the holding of a free and fair election in which an oppositional presidential candidate of a 
different ideology from the ruling coalition (Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Workers’ Party) was elected.  
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The first elected Council of Government was introduced with the 1849 constitution. 
Maltese representatives were still a minority of the members, and suffrage was limited by sex, 
age, literacy, property, and income; which restricted the electorate to less than four percent of the 
population. In addition, while the Council had decision-making power, the Governor could 
override its deliberations. A new constitution granted in 1887 established a Legislative Council 
with a majority of elected Maltese representatives. However, the Governor could still veto or 
override its decisions, and while limitations to suffrage were relaxed, the electoral body was still 
restricted to five percent of the population. When the elected members took a confrontational 
stand against the colonial government, the constitution was revoked. 
A real change was introduced in 1921, when social pressures created by WWI led to the 
promulgation of a new constitution. The Amery-Milner constitution introduced a bicameral 
system with legislative powers. A number of matters – including trade, foreign relations and 
defence – were reserved to the Imperial government; and suffrage was still restricted, including 
by sex. And yet, the 1921 constitution marked a radical change with the introduction of self-rule. 
The next significant changed happened in 1947, when a national assembly approved a new 
constitution which introduced universal suffrage and restricted the reserved matters to those 
touching ‘public safety’. 
While post-second world war Malta had fully representative institutions, it still was a 
British colony. The 1961 Constitution finally established ‘the state of Malta’ which obtained 
independence from Britain on 21 September 1964 following a referendum. The Constitution was 
amended in 1974 to make Malta a Republic. Although Malta had a democratic constitution, a 
free press, and a pluralistic party system, the first decades after independence were years of 
democratic consolidation. Its perfect two-party system, coupled with hyper-majoritarian political 
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institutions (Carammia and Pace 2015), meant that one party could rule the country after winning 
the elections by narrow margins of as little as one thousand votes. The charismatic government 
of Dom Mintoff, the leader of the Labour party in government between 1971 and 1987, was 
particularly controversial. Mintoff steered Malta toward the non-aligned movement, and 
tightened relations with such countries as Libya and North Korea. Eventually, civil liberties were 
tightened during the final years of Labour government. This reflects in Freedom House rankings, 
where Malta is classified as Partly-Free between 1983 and 1987. That was a short parenthesis, 
however; for the rest of the period covered by Freedom House, independent Malta was always 
classified as a free country.  In 2004, forty years after gaining independence, Malta became a 
member of the European Union; four years later, it introduced the Euro as its currency. 
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